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 The dramatic increase in seller or creative financing in the late 1970s and early 1980s has 
captured the attention of many academicians and practitioners. The primary focus in the existing 
literature is on explaining differences in loan terms between creative financing and conventional 
financing and on how these differences are capitalized into sale prices. This paper investigates the role 
of financing opportunity costs and federal income taxation and their consequences on real estate 
financing. Illustrations of the model show the feasibility of interpersonal financing transfers (between 
buyers and sellers) and intertemporal tax transfers (across time periods). 
 
Introduction 
 Historically, the proportion of real estate sales in which some part of the contract price is 
financed by the owner has been quite small. At times during the past few years, however, presumably 
because of high interest rates and changes in tax laws governing installment sales, this proportion has 
become quite high. 
 Also in recent years the academic and professional literature on how buyers and sellers 
interrelate in financial contracts associated with real estate sales has grown dramatically. The major 
concerns in these studies have been with: 1) the allocation among buyers and sellers of selling price 
premiums or discounts resulting from nonconventional financing such as Federal Housing 
Administration/Veterans Administration mortgages, 1loan assumptions,2  and buy downs,3 and 2) the 
techniques used by real estate appraisers for estimating these price effects.4  With the exception of 
Hendershott (1982) who outlines some potential tax savings from owner financing contracts and 
Karlinsky and Kushel (1983) who compare cash flows from several creative financing arrangements, 
questions involving the tax implications of owner financing and the financing compatibility of buyers and 
sellers in such arrangements have not been examined, much less examined in any comprehensive 
fashion.  
 The nontax advantages to buyers and sellers of entering into owner financing agreements are 
well-known. Sellers agree to such arrangements to avoid costs associated with time-on- the-market. 
Buyers are motivated by opportunities to preserve below market rates on existing mortgages and seek 
to avoid high closing and financing costs incurred when taking out a new mortgage from an institution. 
Our paper focuses on the advantages to buyers and sellers with different opportunity costs of entering 
into owner financing agreements and on certain tax advantages of such agreements. Specifically, our 
                                                          
1 See Zerbst and Brueggeman (1977) and Colwell, Gunterman, and Sirmans (1979). For a review see Gunterman (1982). 
2 See Sirmans, Smith, and Sirmans (1983) and Ferreira and Sirmans (1985). 
3 See Agarwal and Phillips (1983). 
4 See, for example, Findlay and Fischer (1983) and Corgel and Goebel (1983). 
purpose is to show how buyers and sellers can use alternative financing arrangements to facilitate 
transfer schemes between them. Such transfers permit two parties to improve their wealth positions 
simultaneously by an appropriate alignment of financing terms. 
 
General Model of Real Estate Transactions5 
 A general real estate transactions model is used here to examine the structure of after-tax, 
incentive compatible transfers between buyers and sellers. To begin, we make some simplifying 
assumptions. First, transactions are assumed to involve only two parties—a representative buyer and a 
representative seller. Second, the mortgage is assumed to be riskless. Third, the imputed rental income 
exclusion is ignored since the model focuses on the actual cash flows of the buyer and seller. The 
mortgage loan is perpetual (i.e., nonamortizing, with periodic interest payment only).6 Finally, we 
assume that the capital gains tax is nonnegative, that is, the contract price is at least as great as the sum 
of the base price and the roll over allowance. 
 The payment and receipt schedules of the buyer and seller at contract price P, where P is paid in 
cash (i.e., all equity financing), are shown in Table 1. The symbols C and R represent the seller’s cost 
basis in the property and roll over allowance (or exclusion) on the capital gain from the sale and   is 
the seller’s capital gain tax rate. 
 Table 2 provides the payment and receipt schedules of the buyer and seller from the same 
transaction, but now involving intermediary financing. In creating a mortgage contract, three essential 
contract provisions can be manipulated—the amount of the down payment, D, the size of the initial loan 
balance or remaining loan balance, L, and the loan rate or yield, Y. In  
 
 
                                                          
5 This model is more fully developed in Ang, Chiang, and Corgel (1986). 
6 Technically, a perpetual mortgage is not really an installment sale. In an installment sale, a portion of the equity is repaid in every period. 
Thus, the capital gains savings from the tax rule would be less than the model implies. For example, at a 10% mortgage rate, the capital gains 
tax savings would be reduced, respectively, by 42% and 20% for a 15-year and 30-year mortgages. 
 
  
comparison to the cash flows resulting from all-equity financing (Table 1), conventional financing 
through an intermediary alters only the cash flows of the buyer. Consequently, the seller is indifferent 
between the all-equity deal and the intermediary financing arrangement since there is no change in his 
welfare. The buyer, however, will gain if the per dollar cost of financing is lower than the buyer’s 
opportunity cost.7 
 In a perfect market with no transaction costs, the cost of financing and the opportunity costs of 
the buyer and seller are the same. However, that is atypical in real estate markets where information 
and transaction costs are high. In those markets, asymmetry in opportunity costs between the buyer 
and seller often exists. When the owner of the property provides financing for the buyer, the contract 
for sale includes the terms of the financing arrangement between the buyer and seller as well as the sale 
price they have negotiated. It is conceivable, therefore, that such an agreement can improve the wealth 
positions of both parties by spanning their investment opportunity set. Furthermore, aligning the 
contract terms in concert with internal revenue service (IRS) rules, the welfare of both parties can be 
enhanced. 
 For tax purposes, a transaction with owner financing would be considered an installment sale.8  
Under current regulation for installment sale reporting, the seller reports the gross profit on the sale 
(defined as the contract price less the seller’s adjusted basis) on a prorated schedule as payments are 
received in future tax years.9  The capital gains tax liability is based only on the profit percentage in each 
year. Thus, the present value of the tax payments is lowered, although total taxes paid by the seller 
during the life of the contract are the same as under the tax treatment for a normal sale (i.e., capital 
gain recognized totally in the year of sale) with either all equity or intermediary financing. 
 An owner financing arrangement is desirable, if and only if, it dominates the all-equity and 
intermediary-financing deals. Consider the possibility of an owner financing arrangement with the 
contract terms (D + d), (L + l), and (Y + y), where d, l , and y are changes in the down payment, mortgage 
loan size, and mortgage rate from those offered by the intermediary, respectively. Table 3 presents the 
                                                          
7Income tax has the same effect on the borrower’s cost of financing and the buyer’s opportunity cost. 
8 Discussions of the tax implications of installment sales are provided in Kau and Sirmans (1982), Jeddeloh and 
Perkins (1982), and Faggen et al. (1984) among other real estate income tax publications. Note that installment 
sale rules do not apply to losses. 
9 I.R.C. §453. 
cash flows resulting from an owner financing agreement, where   is the seller’s tax rate in 
subsequent periods, P' is the new contract price with owner financing, and a = (D + d)/(D + d + L + l), the 
percentage of the down payment (new) to contract price (new).  
 
 We are interested in the question of whether existing tax rules and opportunity cost asymmetry 
offer opportunities for welfare improving choices by the parties in owner financed sales. The answer lies 
in whether these asymmetries between the parties in such transactions can be converted into incentive 
compatible transfers. 
 Interpersonal opportunity cost asymmetry presents an opportunity for improving the wealth of 
the buyer and seller by reshuffling financing terms in the contract between the parties. Similarly, the 
difference between the seller’s ordinary income tax rate, , and capital gain tax rate, , combined 
with the tax savings from an installment sale, creates an opportunity for tax reduction via an 
intertemporal transfer. A general model is presented to facilitate the demonstration of how such tax 
transfers might operate in practice. 
Let 𝐵1 and 𝑆1 be the discounted cash flows to the buyer and seller in an owner financed transaction, 
such that 
 
where 𝑟𝑏 and 𝑟𝑠 are the before-tax opportunity costs of the buyer and seller, respectively. Tax rates have 
no effect on the present values of the interest expenses and incomes in Equations (1) and (2) since tax 
rates cancel in the numerators and denominators of the last term in both equations. 
When Y/𝑟𝑏 is less than one (i.e., the buyer prefers financing), the incentive compatible condition for the 
owner financing is 
 
with strict inequality for at least one of the two conditions. Here ∆B and ∆S, respectively, are differential 
savings to the buyer and seller from entering into an owner financing agreement versus the buyer 
obtaining financing through an intermediary. In a perfect market, Y, 𝑟𝑏 , and 𝑟𝑠  are equal and the capital 
gains tax is the only term that can result in a welfare improvement. However, in general 
 
The second term of Equation (5) is the seller’s capital gains tax saving resulting from the installment sale 
and the change in contract price. The last term of the equation is the seller’s gain (loss) from financing 
even if the contract terms are identical to those available from the intermediary. For example, if Y/𝑟𝑠 is 
greater than one, a gain is realized since the opportunity cost is low relative to Y. 
 When Y/𝑟𝑠 is less than one, the buyer prefers the all-equity deal over financing through an 
intermediary. The resulting incentive compatible condition for owner financing is 
 
Consequently, the buyer must realize savings from the owner financing arrangement vis-a-vis 
intermediary financing for an owner financing contract to be viable. 
 
Interpersonal Financing Transfer 
 Since opportunities for interpersonal transfers emanate from a disparity between opportunity 
costs of buyers and sellers, interpersonal financing transfer schemes are facilitated by adjusting the 
interest payments (incomes) in the contract. The three forms of interpersonal transfers are as follows: 
 
 
Numerical Illustrations of Interpersonal Financing Transfer 
 In a series of numerical examples, we demonstrate how interpersonal financing transfer 
schemes operate. Capital gains taxes are ignored in this part to isolate the effects of interpersonal 
opportunity cost asymmetry. The effects of capital gains taxes are examined later when considering 
intertemporal tax transfer. 
 Any one-to-one tradeoff between the terms of an owner financing arrangement, the down 
payment (D), the mortgage loan amount (L), and the mortgage yield or its equivalent (Y), would be 
mutually beneficial in the first of the three cases cited above. Assume, for example, an owner financing 




%, and 𝑟𝑠  = 10%. 
     Therefore, 
 
Note that the buyer’s per unit cost of financing is less than one, while the seller’s per unit gain from 
financing is greater than one. 
 Now assume the same arrangement with the terms altered in the following way: d = -$10,000, l 
= $10,000, and y = 0 so that D + d = $14,000, L + l = $130,000, and Y + y = 12%. The resulting gains to the 
buyer (i.e., cost savings) and seller are: 
 
These results occur even though the contract price remains unchanged. Furthermore, the welfare 
improvements are determined by the degree of asymmetry in opportunity cost between the buyer and 
seller. 
 In the second form of interpersonal transfer the condition that  𝑟𝑠< 𝑟𝑏 must also by met. Assume 










As in the previous example, we examine the changes in the buyer’s and seller’s wealth positions with a 
one-to-one tradeoff between the down payment and the mortgage loan amount. Let d = - $10,000, l = 
$10,000, and y = 0. Therefore, 
 Since the seller loses with this financing arrangement, the arrangement is not incentive compatible. 
 An incentive compatible contract can be created by having the trade-off between the down 
payment and mortgage loan amount different from one-to-one. Now let d = - $8,000, l = $10,000, and y 
= 0. Recalculating the wealth positions of the buyer and seller yields 
 
 With this type of owner financing, the contract sales price is higher than in the case of 
conventional financing. To complete the transaction and the financing transfer, the decrease in the 
down payment must be smaller than the increase in the mortgage loan amount of yield equivalent, 
 -d/l < l.10 
 For the third type of interpersonal transfer, the condition 𝑟𝑠 < 𝑟𝑏 must be met in addition to 
those cited for the first type of arrangement. In this case, the seller’s gain is more than the buyer’s loss 
from the financing transfer. Thus, a side payment to the buyer in an amount that is, at least, equal to the 
buyer’s loss will make the contract incentive compatible. 
 Assume a transaction with the following terms and characteristics: Y = 12%, L = $120,000, D = 
$24,000, 𝑟𝑏= 11.11%, and 𝑟𝑠  = 10%. Note that 
 
By modifying the conventional financing contract terms asymmetrically for owner financing so that 
                                                          
10 Note that the borrower is indifferent when ∆B equals zero. Holding the mortgage yield constant, the indifference tradeoff between changes 
in mortgage size (l*) and down payment d* occurs at 
d* = -1* Y/rb. 
 
Thus, the indifference points for the borrower in the second example are ($10,000, - $7200) and ($11111, - $8000). Similarly, the seller’s 
indifference tradeoff occurs at 
 
d*= -l*Y/rs + L(Y/rs- 1). 
The indifference points are therefore ($10000, -$8700) and ($9293, -$8000). Comparable analysis can also be performed for cases one and 
three. 
 
d = - $11,000, l = $10,000, and y = 0, an incentive compatible contract is created. The changes in buyer 
and seller wealth are 
 
 The contract price in this owner financed transaction is lower than in the case of conventional 
financing because of a lower down payment or side payment to the buyer relative to the increase in the 
loan amount. As in the previous case, it can be shown that a symmetrical restructuring of terms is not 
incentive compatible. 
Intertemporal Tax Transfer 
Opportunities for intertemporal tax transfer result, in part, from seller tax rate asymmetry across time 
periods. Specifically, intertemporal tax transfer involves: 1) shifting of ordinary income to capital gains 
treatment and thus capitalizing on the rate differential between seller’s ordinary income tax rate and 
capital gains tax rate, and 2) lowering the present value of capital gains tax liability through installment 
sale treatment. 11  
Three alternative strategies for an intertemporal tax transfer with owner financing are as follows: 
1. The loan amount in the owner financing agreement is less than the loan amount with 
intermediary financing, but the rate is higher. The down payment is the same. In 
symbols, l < 0, y > 0, and d = 0. This strategy requires that > 0. 
2. The down payment in the owner financing agreement is less than the down payment 
with-intermediary financing, but the rate is higher. In symbols, d < 0, y > 0, and l = 0.12   
3. The down payment in the owner financing agreement is larger than the down payment 
with intermediary financing, but the rate is lower. The loan amount is unchanged. In 
symbols, d > 0, y < 0, and l = 0.13 
 
Numerical Example of Intertemporal Tax Transfer 
As with the alternative interpersonal tax transfer arrangements, numerical examples are used to 
demonstrate how the three intertemporal tax transfer strategies work. 
 To examine the effects of a reduction in the loan amount (l < 0) and an increase in the rate (y > 
0) (i.e., strategy 1) relative to intermediary financing, the following terms and characteristics are 
assumed: D = $24,000, L = $120,000, Y = 12%,  = 20%, and C + R = $74,000. Now let l = -Ly/(Y + y) 
(i.e., no change in the interest payment per period) and d = 0, and y = 1%. This implies that l = -$9,231. 
                                                          
11 The tax transfer also depends on the seller’s discount rate which can change over time. 
12 the simplified form of the required condition for strategy 2 is rb > rs. 
13 The simplified form of the required condition for strategy 3 is 1 - tsg < rb/rs 
In this case ∆B and ∆S are the buyer’s and seller’s gains from the tax transfer only.14  Therefore, 
 
As long as Y/rs is greater than one, any loss from owner financing would not offset the gain from the tax 
transfer shown above as AS. The advantage of this strategy, which provides for an increase in Y and 
reduction in L, is that L is taxed twice while the income from Y is taxed only once. 
 To examine the effects of a reduction in the down payment (d < 0) and an increase in the rate (y 
> 0) as in strategy 2, the following terms and characteristics are assumed: D = $24,000, L =$120,000, C + 
R =$74,000, Y = 12%, 𝑟𝑠= 11.11%, and 𝑟𝑏 = 13.33%. 
15  
 Now assume an owner financing contract with y = 1 %, d = - $9,100, and l = 0. The resulting 
changes in the buyer’s (saving) and seller’s (gain) wealth positions are 
 
In this case, ∆S includes the gains from financing (the last term of the above equation). The sum of the 
first four terms of ∆S, which represents the benefit from tax transfer, is positive. 
 Finally, to examine the effects of an increase in the down payment (d > 0) together with a 
reduction in the rate (+ < 0) relative to intermediary financing, the following terms and characteristics 
are assumed: D = $24,000, L = $120,000, C + R = $74,000, Y = 12%, = 1%,  𝑟𝑠= 11.11%, and 𝑟𝑏 = 
10.91%. Note that 
 
Now assume an owner financing contract with d = $10,900, y = — 1 %, and 1 = 0. The resulting change in 
the buyer’s (savings) and seller’s (gain) wealth positions are 
                                                          
14 The term L(Y/rs - 1) of Equation (5), the seller’s gain, is ignored in every numerical example of intertemporal tax transfer to 
highlight the gain from the tax transfer. 
15 Note that Y/rb = 0.90 and Y/rs = 1.08 so the required condition is satisfied. 
  
Conclusions 
 Owner financing of real estate is an interesting topic of study because it involves a merger of the 
contract for sale (i.e., investment decision) and the mortgage contract (i.e., financing decision). As 
evidenced by the empirical results of studies examining the effects of such mergers, the prices 
established in owner financed transactions often diverge from competitive market prices adjusted for 
below market financing. In addition, there is the related issue of consumer choice in the selection of 
owner financing over intermediary financing. 
 The examples presented in this paper have implications for both issues. By establishing the 
conditions for incentive compatible contracting between buyers and sellers (in which the contract 
includes both the terms of sale and the terms of financing), we demonstrate how interpersonal 
financing and intertemporal tax asymmetries can be converted into mutual welfare improvements. The 
choice between owner financing and intermediary financing depends on the relative magnitudes of 
𝑟𝑏and 𝑟𝑠.
16 Under conditions which 𝑟𝑏and 𝑟𝑠 are not simultaneously favorable to owner financing, the 
parties can still consummate an owner financed transaction by negotiating terms other than those 
involving one-to-one tradeoffs between L and D. Side payments facilitate incentive compatible 
contracting but may result in prices that are higher than with conventional financing. 
 Intertemporal tax asymmetries can also lead to tax transfers in owner financial sales. These 
result from the ability to save tax payments through an intertemporal alignment of terms. Since the 
intermediary usually cannot participate in such tax transfer schemes, consumers have an additional 
incentive to choose owner financing. 
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